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ABOLITION OF GUILT IN MARRIAGE
DISSOLUTION: WISCONSIN'S ADOPTION OF
NO-FAULT DIVORCE
INTRODUCTION
On February 1, 1978, Chapter 105 of the Wisconsin Laws of
1977 became effective. The act, which was modeled after the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, I revised most of Chapter
247 of the statutes. The most controversial of the new provi-
sions, from both legislative and public points of view, is the one
which establishes the "irretrievable breakdown of the nar-
riage" as the sole ground for divorce.2 In effect, this legislation
added Wisconsin to the growing number of jurisdictions which
have adopted "no-fault" divorce statutes. Wisconsin is one of
eight states3 which have enacted the Uniform Act or modifica-
tions of this act; a number of other states have adopted other
no-fault standards.
Wisconsin judges and legal practitioners will benefit from
the guidance available from other no-fault jurisdictions when
interpreting the new divorce laws. The purpose of this paper is
to briefly review the development of no-fault legislation both
nationally and in Wisconsin as well as to examine standards
and guidelines on issues arising from such legislation. This
examination should provide a better understanding of the im-
plications of the adoption of the irretrievable breakdown test
for future Wisconsin divorce actions.
BACKGROUND
Because society is very much concerned with the mainte-
nance of marital relationships, such relationships are made
1. See 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 459 (master ed. 1973). As initially approved by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws, the act did not provide
guidelines on how to determine if the marriage was irretrievably broken and for this
reason the American Bar Association rejected it in 1971. The Uniform Marriage Act
was finally approved in 1974 by the A.B.A.'s Family Law Section even though the
irretrievable breakdown concept remained controversial. The Legislative Response to
Divorce: A Survey of No-Fault Divorce, Informational Bulletin 76-IB-5 (May 1976)
[hereinafter cited as The Legislative Response]. See also UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND Di-
VORCE ACT § 305.
2. 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 105, § 23.
3. Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Kentucky, Montana, New Jersey and Washington
have also passed marriage and divorce acts similar or identical to the Uniform Act.
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE COMMISSION ON UNIFORM STATE LAw
(1976).
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subject to regulation and control by the state.' Thus, a state's
legislature is responsible for prescribing the procedures for
marriage and divorce.5 Moreover, because of this interest, the
state is considered a third party in divorce proceedings.6
State laws governing the marital relationship have tradi-
tionally attempted to foster and protect the relationship, to
make it a permanent and public institution, and fo prevent
separation.7 This policy is evidenced by legislative enactments
which make it difficult to end a marriage for trivial or inconse-
quential reasons,8 and require satisfactory proof of specific
grounds as prerequisites to divorce Once a marital relation-
ship is formed, the law has traditionally stepped in to hold the
parties to its various obligations and responsibilities.'"
Modern concepts of public policy have shifted away from
the traditional emphasis on preventing marital breakdowns.
The prior strict approach to divorce, where the state was re-
sponsible for guarding marital relationships," has been slowly
eroded. Today, because both the husband and wife can usually
function in society separately and independently, the interest
of the state in the continuance of the marriage is perceived to
be small.12 Public policy does not encourage keeping two people
together once the legitimate objects of matrimony have ceased
to exist.' 3 Dissolution of the marriage is not contrary to public
policy if the marriage has so deteriorated that there is little
hope of reconciliation."
In Wisconsin the right to obtain a divorce is purely statu-
tory 5 and the state has a right to fix, regulate and control it as
to every person within its jurisdiction.8 Given this approach,
together with the public policy declarations in the Family
4. Bounds v. Bounds, 135 Md. 220, 108 A. 870 (1919).
5. Trask v. Trask, 381 N.Y.S.2d 584, 85 Misc. 2d 980 (1976).
6. Reville v. Reville, 370 A.2d 249 (Me. 1977).
7. Hill v. Hill, 23 Cal. 2d 82, 142 P.2d 417 (1943).
8. Welling v. Welling, 144 Ind. App. 182, 245 N.E.2d 173 (1969).
9. Graham v. Graham, 44 Ill. App. 3d 519, 358 N.E.2d 308 (1976).
10. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
11. McGowan v. McGowan, 15 Ill. App. 3d 913, 305 N.E.2d 261 (1973).
12. Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1972).
13. In re Marriage of Frank, 542 P.2d 845 (Colo. 1975).
14. Glickman v. Collins, 13 Cal. App. 3d 852, 533 P.2d 204 (1975).
15. Zachman v. Zachman, 9 Wis. 2d 335, 101 N.W.2d 55 (1960); Halmu v. Halmu,
247 Wis. 124, 19 N.W.2d 317 (1945); Dovi v. Dovi, 245 Wis. 50, 13 N.W.2d 585 (1944).
16. Cook v. Cook, 56 Wis. 195, 14 N.W. 33 (1882).
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Code,'7 it is not surprising that post-Code decisions of the Wis-
consin Supreme Court have emphasized traditional theory
with the state as the guardian of marital relationships. For
example, this traditional family law approach was clearly ar-
ticulated in Heffernan v. Heffernan" where the court reminded
trial courts that it is the policy of this state to promote the
stability and the best interests of marriage and the family and
that this public interest must be taken into account in divorce
actions. 9
FAULT APPROACH
The evolution of fault as a prerequisite to dissolution of
marriage is rooted in medieval concepts of marriage which fa-
vored total abolition of divorce.2" Judeo-Christian religions
looked at marriage as a permanently binding union witnessed
by God which no man could put "asunder."' 2' A reintroduction
of divorce was later necessitated, however, by the general dis-
satisfaction with a divorceless society which soon became ap-
parent. Nevertheless, post-medieval divorce laws could not
shed religious values which had previously prevented their en-
actment, and the idea that a spouse must sin against the mar-
riage as a prerequisite to divorce arose. This concept of marital
sin/fault is the foundation of traditional divorce laws which
require a wrongful act or, more commonly, "grounds" for di-
vorce.
22
17. Wis. STAT. § 245.001(2) (1975) provides:
INTENT. It is the intent of chs. 245 to 248 to promote the stability and best
interests of marriage and the family. Marriage is the institution that is the
foundation of the family and of society. Its stability is basic to morality and
civilization, and of vital interest to society and the state. The consequences of
the marriage contract are more significant to society than those of other con-
tracts, and the public interest must be taken into account always. The serious-
ness of marriage makes adequate premarital counseling and education for fam-
ily living highly desirable and courses thereon are urged upon all persons con-
templating marriage. The impairment or dissolution of the marriage relation
generally results in injury to the public wholly apart from the effect upon the
parties immediately concerned.
18. 27 Wis. 2d 307, 134 N.W.2d 439 (1965).
19. Id. at 313, 134 N.W.2d at 442. See also Wis. STAT. § 245.001(2) (1975).
20. Bodenheimer, Reflections on the Future of Grounds for Divorce, 8 J. FAM. L.
179, 186 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Bodenheimer]. This rigid approach was traced
to later Roman society in which any semblance of ordered family life had disappeared.
This breakdown was witnessd by Stoic philosophers and the early Christians. In turn,
they condemned these conditions and reacted by bringing about complete abolition of
divorce in the Middle Ages. Id.
21. Mark 10:9.
22. See Bodenheimer, supra note 20.
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The concept of fault finding easily lent itself to codification
and, as a result, the law regulating divorce became strictly
statutory. A court could grant only such relief as the statutes
prescribed.23 This meant that courts simply had no power to
grant divorce on grounds other than those listed in the stat-
utes.24 Each state's legislature had the exclusive right and
power to regulate, control and prescribe the conditions for di-
vorce which would apply to persons within its territorial limits.
An obvious and highly criticized result of such a system was
forum shopping, as individuals sought the jurisdiction with the
least stringent prerequisites for obtaining a divorce.
Wisconsin has not had the reputation of being an "easy
divorce state." The legislature had clearly stated its belief in
the undesirability of divorce" and, through its interpretation of
the law, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had demonstrated a
firm commitment to the fault concept.28 The state's enumer-
ated fault grounds were fairly typical: adultery, impotency,
imprisonment of either party for three years or more, desertion,
cruel and inhuman treatment, habitual drunkenness, non-
support and commitment to a mental institution. 27 Neverthe-
less, as early as 1866, the state had provided an inroad into the
fault concept by allowing divorce "whenever the husband and
wife shall have voluntarily lived entirely separate for the space
of five years." 2 Wisconsin was, in fact, one of the first states
to enact such a no-fault ground. In 1971, the required period
of separation was shortened to one year.29
FAULT WITH FAULT
A major criticism of fault-based divorce is that because it
is strictly statutory, if the state has not provided a ground
which applies in a given case, the parties must try to manufac-
ture one or go forum shopping for an amenable jurisdiction. 0
If "technical grounds cannot be found or manufactured, the
23. Hirchert v. Hirchert, 243 Wis. 519, 11 N.W.2d 157 (1943).
24. Hagen v. Hagen, 205 Va. 791, 139 S.E.2d 821 (1965); Cahill v. Cahill, 26 Wis.
2d 173, 131 N.W.2d 842 (1965).
25. See note 17 supra.
26. See note 18 supra.
27. Wis. STAT. § 247.07 (1975).
28. 1866 Wis. Laws ch. 37.
29. 1971 Wis. Laws ch. 220.
30. See generally Washington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L.
REv. 32 (1966).
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parties may both live in abject misery, in an arrangement nei-
ther may want but which must be continued, at least in name,
by legislative fiat. ' 31 Judges have particular difficulty with
fault finding since they must fix the blame and decide which
party is more deserving of divorce.3 2 The breakdown of the
marriage is rarely the fault of one spouse; more often, it is the
result of a complex interaction between two or more personali-
ties.3 3 Moreover, finding a spouse guilty of a fault necessarily
influences property division and alimony awards,34 because the
natural inclination of any person is to penalize the "guilty"
party and compensate the "wronged" one. A finding of fault
can also materially affect child custody determinations by prej-
udicing the case of the "guilty" spouse. 5
Perhaps the most frustrating and bewildering aspect of
guilt-based divorce is the assertion of defenses. To better un-
derstand the dilemma it is necessary to keep in mind that
originally only an innocent, fault-free spouse could bring an
action for divorce. This innocent spouse requirement led to one
of the most unrealistic defenses ever devised by legislators,
recrimination. Recrimination in effect denied divorce where
both spouses were guilty of marital misconduct.3 6 The illogical
and undersirable result of this doctrine was that such spouses
had to continue living together or to live apart without divorce.
Although Wisconsin initially recognized recrimination,
37
this defense was abolished in 1971 and replaced with the doc-
trine of comparative rectitude .3 Under the latter doctrine, trial
courts had discretion to grant a divorce to a party who was not
blameless if on the whole that party's equities appeared supe-
rior.39 Other traditional defenses necessitated by a fault theory
of divorce were collusion, connivance and condonation." These
31. Goldstein & Gitter, On Abolition of Grounds for Divorce: A Model Statute and
Commentary, 3 FAM. L.Q. 75, 80 (1969).
32. Id. at 79.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Helden v. Helden, 7 Wis. 276, 303 (1858) (where the court ruled that
a woman who has been guilty of adultery is not entitled to support out of the husband's
estate).
35. Vogel v. Vogel, 259 Wis. 373, 48 N.W.2d 501 (1951).
36. Couch, Toward a More Realistic Divorce Law, 43 TUL. L. Rav. 243, 255 (1968-
1969).
37. Bahr v. Bahr, 272 Wis. 323, 75 N.W.2d 301 (1956).
38. 1971 Wis. Laws ch. 220.
39. Wis. STAT. § 247.101 (1975).
40. Wis. STAT. § 247.10 (1975).
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defenses, along with comparative rectitude, were abolished
with Wisconsin's enactment of the new no-fault legislation."
NO-FAULT TRENDS
As previously noted, many jurisdictions with traditional
divorce laws included as grounds for divorce, certain grounds
which were not fault-based. Typical grounds not based on fault
are insanity,4 2 voluntary separation43 and incompatibility."
The ground of incompatibility resembles the irretrievable
breakdown ground since its use in some jurisdictions does not
require proof of matrimonial misconduct and either party can
secure a divorce without alleging or proving that the other was
responsible for the incompatibility. All that is necessary is that
a plaintiff establish an existing state of incompatibility." In-
compatibility has never been a ground for divorce under Wis-
consin law.
The first explicit acceptance of no-fault divorce was Califor-
nia's enactment of a comprehensive no-fault divorce statute in
1968.46 That legislation was the end product of legislative and
judicial response to a 1952 California Supreme Court decision,
DeBurgh v."DeBurgh,41 which discussed the problems of ad-
ministering a fault-based system. In DeBurgh, where a divorce
had been denied at the trial court level because of the recrimi-
nation defense, the California court identified considerations
which should govern in divorce actions where fault had been
demonstrated on both sides.4 The ultimate problem with
DeBurgh was that these considerations did not come into play
until the fault of both spouses had been proven. Nevertheless,
the holding is still noteworthy in that it presaged the shift in
focus from the causes of marital breakdown to the fact of the
breakdown itself.
41. 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 105, § 18.
42. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 247.07(9) (1975).
43. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 247.07(6) (1975).
44. Generally defined as a deep and irreconcilable conflict in the personalities or
temperament of the parties making it impossible for them to continue a normal marital
relationship. E.g., Inskeep v. Inskeep, 5 Iowa 204 (1857).
45. Bassett v. Bassett, 56 N.M. 739, 250 P.2d 487 (1952).
46. CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 4500-4540 (West 1970).
47. 250 P.2d 598 (1952).
48. The wife had filed for divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty and the husband
cross-complained on the same ground. At the trial court, both were found guilty and
each was denied divorce on the ground of recrimination. Id. at 605-06.
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NO-FAULT IN WISCONSIN
Wisconsin's interest in no-fault divorce surfaced in the 1971
legislative session where some of the requirements for obtaining
divorce were eased.49 Then in the 1975 session, several bills were
introduced relating to divorce, child custody and alimony;
however, none of these bills progressed beyond its house of
origin. 10
In January 1977, Assembly Bill 100, which proposed the
adoption of a no-fault divorce law patterned after the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act, was introduced." The bill's propo-
nents contended that it would make divorce more humane And
afford more economic protection to women and children; its
opponents argued strongly that it would make a mockery of
marriage and Would lead to a breakdown of family life in Wis-
consin.52
After extended discussion and parliamentary maneuvering,
Assembly Bill 100 was subsequently approved and went into
effect on February 1, 1978. 5 The law established the irretrieva-
ble breakdown of the marriage" as the sole ground for divorce
in the state.
49. For example, the minimum period of voluntary separation needed to obtain a
divorce was shortened from five years to one year; the two year residency requirement
was reduced to 6 months and involuntary commitment was added as a ground for
divorce. 1971 Wis. Laws ch. 220.
50. Wis. A.B. 642, 995, 1246 (1975 sess.); Wis. S.B. 22, 23, 181 (1975 sess.). See The
Legislative Response, supra note 1, at 7.
51. It was patterned after Wis. A.B. 995 (1975 sess.).
52. Milwaukee Sentinel, July 15, 1977, § 1, at 5, col. 1.
53. 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 105.
54. 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 105, § 23 (to be codified as Wis. STAT. § 247.12(2)) provides:
IRRrmEvABLE BREAKnowN. (a) If both of the parties by petition or otherwise
have stated under oath or affirmation that the marriage is irretrievably broken,
or if the parties have voluntarily lived apart continuously for 12 months or more
immediately prior to commencement of the action and one party has so stated,
the court, after hearing, shall make a finding that the marriage is irretrievably
broken.
(b) If the parties have not voluntarily lived apart for at least 12 months
immediately prior to commencement of the action and if only one party has
stated under oath or affirmation that the marriage is irretrievably broken, the
court shall consider all relevant factors, including the circumstances that gave
rise to filing the petition and the prospect of reconciliation.
1. If the court finds no reasonable prospect of reconciliation, it shall make
a finding that the marriage is irretrievably broken; or
2. If the court finds that there is a reasonable prospect of reconciliation, it
shall continue the matter for further hearing not fewer than 30 nor more than
60 days later, or as soon thereafter as the matter may be reached on the court's
calendar, and may suggest to the parties that they seek counseling. The court,
[Vol. 61:672
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WHAT IS NO-FAULT?
The essence of a no-fault law is the abandonment of the
concept of fault or marital guilt as a determinative factor in
divorce proceedings . 5 Assignment of blame is irrelevant and is
replaced by a search for the realities of the marital situation.-"
In a no-fault proceeding there is a shift in focus from actions
of the individual parties to the viability of the marriage itself.57
While the language employed in no-fault statutes varies ac-
cording to jurisdiction, all define marital breakdown as a
ground for marital dissolution. In some jurisdictions a party
must establish the fact of marital breakdown; in others the
establishment of irreconcilable differences or of a period of sep-
aration is prima facie proof of such a breakdown. Some states
have chosen to establish the no-fault action as an option to
lawsuits filed on traditional grounds, while others have aban-
doned fault-based divorce altogether.
The central issue involved in interpreting no-fault statutes
is the definition of the dissolution of the relationship necessary
to establish grounds for divorce. Wisconsin incorporates both
a per se and a subjective test of irretrievable breakdown in its
statute. In Wisconsin irretrievable breakdown is an irrebutta-
ble presumption where both parties have so stated under oath
or affirmation, or, where the parties have voluntarily lived
apart continuously for twelve months or more immediately
prior to the commencement of the action and one party has so
stated.5 8 In cases where neither of these two conditions are met,
the determination of irretrievable breakdown is left to the
courts after a consideration of all relevant factors. In such in-
stances the court may adjourn the hearing for up to sixty days
and may order counseling.59
The decisions and statutes of other jurisdictions will be par-
ticularly helpful to Wisconsin practitioners and judges when
the per se grounds of section 247.12(2)(a) are not available. For
example, the Iowa test for marital breakdown provides that:
at the request of either party or on its own motion, may order counseling. At
the adjourned hearing, if either party states under oath or affirmation that the
marriage is irretrievably broken, the court shall make a finding whether the
marriage is irretrievably broken.
55. In re Fink's Marriage, 54 Cal. App. 3d 357, 126 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1976).
56. Dickson v. Dickson, 238 Ga. 672, 235 S.E.2d 479 (1977).
57. Mattson v. Mattson, 376 A.2d 473 (Me. 1977).
58. 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 105, § 23.
59. Id.
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A decree dissolving the marriage may be entered when the
court is satisfied from the evidence presented that there has
been a breakdown of the marriage relationship to the extent
that the legitimate objects of matrimony have been destroyed
and there remains no reasonable likelihood that the marriage
can be preserved."
The Maine and Nebraska courts, interpreting irreconcilable
differences language, have stressed the gravity and complete-
ness of the deterioration required. Differences cannot be trivial
or minor, but must be of such a degree as to make living to-
gether intolerable to the point that the breakdown of the mar-
riage can be legally implied.' Proving inability to live together
does not require the presentation in court of the ugly and sordid
details of either party's conduct." A mere refusal to cohabitate
with no chance for reconciliation is sufficient. 3
In Florida, a more inclusive test has been formulated. Ryan
v. Ryan64 held that a marriage is irretrievably broken if, for
whatever reason or cause, no matter whose fault, a relationship
is for all intents and purposes finished, no longer viable and a
hollow sham beyond hope of reconciliation or repair. 5 The New
York court, in Christian v. Christian,"6 stressed that it is the
actual, physical separation rather than the separation agree-
ment or decree that constitutes the basis for no-fault di-
vorce-legal action is simply intended as evidence that the
separation is in fact authentic and final.
Some courts have stressed a more subjective test of irrecon-
cilability which looks to the reasonable belief of the petitioner
concerning the differences alleged.67 If a court uses a subjective
test, however, it cannot apply any predetermined criteria to the
perceived differences. Rather, it must consider the state of
mind of the parties toward the relationship. 8 When using a
60. IowA CoDE ANN. § 598.17 (West 1970). This is the same test applied by the
California courts in their interpretation of irreconcilable differences. In re Walton's
Marriage, 28 Cal. App. 3d 108, 104 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1972).
61. See Mattson v. Mattson, 376 A.2d 473 (Me. 1977); Mathias v. Mathias, 194
Neb. 598, 234 N.W.2d 212 (1975).
62. Baxla v. Baxla, 522 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
63. Harwell v. Harwell, 233 Ga. 89, 209 S.E.2d 625 (1974).
64. 277 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1973).
65. Id. at 271.
66. 42 N.Y.2d 63, 365 N.E.2d 849, 396 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1977).
67. See Dunn v. Dunn, 511 P.2d 427 (Or. App. 1973).
68. Woodruff v. Woodruff, 320 A.2d 661 (N.H. 1974). See also Desrochers v. Des-
rochers, 347 A.2d 150 (N.H. 1975).
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subjective test, a court cannot look for observable acts or occur-
ences in the relationship, nor for causes of deterioration.
Rather, it must determine whether, because of the basic un-
suitability of the spouses and their states of mind toward the
marriage itself, the marriage is in fact ended.69 Both parties
testifying that, simply and realistically, it is no longer possible
for them to live together as husband and wife constitutes the
simplest proof of irretrievable breakdown.70
ATrACKS ON NO-FAULT
As previously noted, divorce is neither a constitutional right
nor a necessity to survival. Rather, it is a creature of statute
and thus, the plenary power to prescribe the conditions to its
attainment is vested in the state." The constitutionality of no-
fault divorce statutes has been challenged in a number of in-
stances. So far, however, these challenges have met with little
or no success. Still, they must be noted in anticipation of simi-
lar attacks in Wisconsin.
Both the United States7 2 and Wisconsin7r 3 Constitutions pro-
tect an individual's right to contract. No-fault divorce statutes
have been challenged as impairing contractual rights. Some
states have cut off this potential issue by recognizing that a
marriage contract is not a contract within the meaning of the
contract clause in the state's constitution. But even where the
marriage obligation is treated as a traditional contractual obli-
gation, no-fault statutes have been found not to be an improper
impairment of such obligation.7 5 Family laws which promote
the public interest are considered to be a legitimate exercise of
the police power of the state and are thus constitutional when
they are not palpably unreasonable." Wisconsin recognizes the
contractual nature of a marriage relationship 77 and also recog-
nizes the state's right to control it by reasonable and appropri-
69. Riley v. Riley, 271 So. 2d 181 (Fla. App. 1972).
70. Adams v: Adams, 238 Ga. 326, 232 S.E.2d 919 (1977).
71. Sosna v. Iowa, 360 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Iowa 1973).
72. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.
73. WIS. CONST, art. 1, § 12.
74. See In re Marriage of Frank, 542 P.2d 845 (Colo. 1975); see also In re Marriage
of Walton, 28 Cal. App. 3d 108, 104 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1972).
75. See Lindsley v. Lindsley, 374 A.2d 311 (Me. 1977). See also Ryan v. Ryan, 277
So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1973).
76. Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798, 804 (Mo. App. 1977).
77. Wis. STAT. § 245.01 (1975).
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ate regulations, 8 so the decisions holding no-fault statutes to
be reasonable regulation are important precedent. In a number
of states, it also has been argued that no-fault statutes, being
vague and indefinite, violate the respective due process79
clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The Georgia
court in Dickson v. Dickson" held that a no-fault provision
concerning an irretrievably broken marriage did not violate due
process on the alleged claim of being too vague and indefinite
because the statutory language was capable of definition and
application. In In re Cosgrove's Marriage, ' the California court
rejected a similar claim noting that the new grounds for divorce
were no more vague than earlier grounds. Wisconsin's
"irretrievable breakdown" language may also invite attacks
based on statutory vagueness but all precedent suggests that
such attacks will be futile. As the Maine court in Mattson v.
Mattson concluded, a lack of definiteness is often desirable in
divorce statutes in that such language allows a court to provide
individual attention to each case.82
Claims based on deprivation of vested rights have also been
rejected. In In re Walton's Marriage,8 3 the California court
found that granting a husband's petition for dissolution of mar-
riage based on a no-fault statute did not unconstitutionally
deprive the wife of her vested interest in her married status. In
Corder v. Corder,84 the Missouri court upheld the property dis-
tribution provision of the no-fault statute. That court found
that whatever divestment took place complied with the re-
quirements of due process where the property was to be divided
in such proportions as the court deemed just after considering
all the relevant factors. 85
One final area of attack against no-fault statutes is that a
no-fault statute necessarily impedes the discretion of the court
since a court is denied the narration of all the details of the
breakdown. However, in Missouri, no-fault provisions have
been found not to be an encroachment on the judiciary8l and
78. Boehmer v. Kalk, 155 Wis. 156, 144 N.W. 182 (1913).
79. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
80. 238 Ga. 672, 235 S.E.2d 479 (1977).
81. 27 Cal. App. 3d 424, 103 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1972).
82. 376 A.2d 473, 475-76 (Me. 1977).
83. 28 Cal. App. 3d 108, 104 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1972).
84. 546 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. App. 1977).
85. Id. at 804.
86. Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. App. 1977).
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the New Hampshire court has ruled that dissolution of mar-
riage under a no-fault process remains a judicial, rather than
a ministerial, determination.87 However, a Colorado court has
ruled that it is an impermissible judicial amendment to enun-
ciate goals of marriage which must be either lost or beyond
accomplishment as prerequisites to classification of a relation-
ship as irretrievably broken.8
PROOF AND DEFENSES
Observable occurrences in the marriage relationship and
the causes of the condition of the relationship are not particu-
larly relevant to the question which one court defined as
whether it is now time to give the marriage a decent burial.8 1
Proof of fault has generally been held inadmissible in no-fault
divorce actions since the fault concept has been eliminated by
enactment of no-fault statutes. Such evidence of fault has
been held inadmissible on the issue of property settlement,
alimony and support since the concept of rewarding the inno-
cent party and punishing the guilty one has been abolished.91
One exception to the rule of inadmissibility of evidence of fault
has developed in California where evidence of specific acts of
misconduct is admissible when a child's custody is at issue and
such evidence is relevant to that issue. 2
In most no-fault states, including Wisconsin, defenses to
divorce have been judicially or legislatively eliminated. While
the Wisconsin no-fault statute eliminates the former defenses,93
in some instances, the court is still required to weigh the evi-
dence supplied by both parties. If the allegation of irretriev-
able breakdown is denied by one spouse and the required pe-
riod of separation has not been met, Wisconsin's new no-fault
law specifically provides that "the court shall consider all rele-
vant factors, including the circumstances that gave rise to fil-
87. Woodruff v. Woodruff, 320 A.2d 661 (N.H. 1974).
88. In re Marriage of Baer, 561 P.2d 20 (Colo. App. 1977).
89. Cooper v. Cooper, 57 Ala. App. 674, 331 So. 2d 689 (1976).
90. In re Marriage of Williams, 199 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1972).
91. See generally Rosan v. Rosan, 24 Cal. App. 3d 885, 101 Cal. Rptr. 295 (1972);
Juick v. Juick, 21 Cal. App. 3d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1971); In re Marriage of
Williams, 199 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1972); see also text accompanying notes 34-35 supra.
92. McKim v. McKim, 6 Cal. App. 3d 673, 100 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1972); In re Marriage
of Walton, 28 Cal. App. 3d 108, 104 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1972); cf. text accompanying notes
120-23 infra for the factors examined in Wisconsin in a child custody determination.
93. See text accompanying notes 36-41 supra.
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ing the petition and the prospect of reconciliation."94 One court
has stated that when one party denies a claim that the mar-
riage is irretrievably broken, in effect, a no-fault statute be-
comes a modified no-fault law since the trial court must neces-
sarily make a finding on all the relevant factors 5
APPLYING No-FAULT: RETROACTIVITY
A primary concern in any jurisdiction adopting no-fault
divorce is its effect on pending litigation and procedural mo-
tions. The Wisconsin law specifically provides that it applies
"to all actions affecting marriage, and to all actions for modifi-
cation or enforcement of previously entered orders in actions
affecting marriage, which are commenced on and after the
effective date of this act."9 Wisconsin follows the general rule
that no-fault divorce statutes do not apply retroactively.97
Given the general specificity of the statutes, the issue of
whether a no-fault statute operates prospectively or retrospec-
tively has been seldom litigated. In McKim v. McKim,1 the
court held that a new no-fault statute was applicable to pend-
ing divorce actions but only by operation of the statute and its
implementing rules. Similar statutes have been held applica-
ble to appeals sustained after the effective date in Nebraska
and Florida.9 In Iowa and Florida new statutes have been held
inapplicable in actions tried and decided before the effective
date in the absence of an agreement otherwise by the parties. 00
Finally, the Oregon statute has been found not to apply to
actions filed before, but tried after, its effective date.10'
94. 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 105, § 23.
95. See In re Marriage of Capstick, 547 S.W.2d 522 (Mo. App. 1977); see also In re
Marriage of Mitchell, 545 S.W.2d 313 (Mo. App. 1976) (where the court held that the
Divorce Reform Act was not a true no-fault type of legislation).
96. 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 105, § 62.
97. Morgan v. Morgan, 507 P.2d 409 (Or. App. 1973).
98. 6 Cal. App. 3d 673, 100 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1972).
99. Lienemarm v. Lienemann, 189 Neb. 626, 204 N.W.2d 170 (1973); see also Melin
v. Melin, 265 So. 2d 414 (Fla. App. 1972); Willis v. Willis, 254 So. 2d 59 (Fla. App.
1971).
100. See generally Taplin v. Taplin, 341 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. App. 1977); Wilson v.
Wilson, 197 N.W.2d 589 (Iowa 1972); In re Neff, 193 N.W.2d 82 (Iowa 1971).
101. See generally Morgan v. Morgan, 507 P.2d 409 (Or. App. 1973).
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OTHER MAJOR REvIsIONS IN WISCONSIN DIVORCE LAW:
Annulment
Essentially, an annulment is a judicial declaration stating
that no valid marriage ever took place or no marriage relation-
ship ever existed. This is to be distinguished from a divorce
action which severs an existing marriage. The reasons given to
effectuate the annulment must necessarily have been in exist-
ence at the time the marriage took place. As in divorce, a
court's jurisdiction in an annulment proceeding is statutory.12
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has allowed an annulment only
if there existed specific statutory grounds authorizing its grant-
ing. Prior decisions left no room for judicial discretion at the
trial court level. Where statutory grounds for annulment ex-
isted, the court was required to grant it. This was the situation
in Eliot v. Eliot:10 3
The statute imposes no other or further restriction upon the
right of action than the one above mentioned. . . . It is fair
to assume that, had the Legislature intended other restric-
tions upon the right of action, it would have expressed the
same in statute . . . . In our opinion it is not permissible for
the court to interpolate conditions and exceptions and re-
strictions upon the right of action, not expressed therein, and
which would thwart the plain legislative intention on the
subject."0 4
The prior annulment laws were codified in section 247.02 of
the Wisconsin Statutes."' This section was repealed by the new
law and replaced with newly created section 247.0316 which
adopted the Uniform Act's'07 grounds for annulment. Section
247.03(1) provides that an annulment may be granted if a party
lacks "capacity to consent to the marriage at the time . . .
[it] was solemnized, either because of age, . . . mental inca-
pacity or infirmity or . . . influence of alcohol, drugs, . . . or
• . . was induced to enter into a marriage by force or duress,
or by fraud." Subsection (2) authorizes an annulment if one of
the spouses was unable to consummate the marriage by sexual
102. Kuehne v. Kuehne, 185 Wis. 195, 201 N.W. 506 (1924).
103. 81 Wis. 295, 51 N.W. 81 (1892).
104. Id. at 299, 51 N.W. at 82.
105. Wis. STAT. § 247.02 (1975).
106. 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 105, § 9.
107. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 208; see also note 1 supra.
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intercourse, as long as the other party did not know of the
incapacity at the time of the ceremony. Subsection (3) invali-
dates a marriage if "a party was 16 or 17 years of age and did
not have consent of his or her parent or guardian or judicial
approval, or a party was under 16 years of age." Finally,
subsection (4) provides for a right to annulment where there
was a legal prohibition of the marriage.
Counseling
The recreated section 247.081 continues to require that fam-
ily court commissioners provide counseling for marriage assess-
ment, divorce and separation. Petitioners are required to at-
tend counseling sessions if they bring actions for divorce or
legal separation; respondents are also required to participate in
the sessions if they are personally served within the state.
Counseling is to be made available on a voluntary basis for
parties to annulment proceedings."' 8
Property Division and Maintenance Payments
Apart from adopting the no-fault standard, it is in the areas
of property division and alimony payments that the new law
most radically differs from prior case law. Moreover, in both of
these instances, chapter 105 is significantly more precise than
the earlier statutes.
The new law, section 247.27, contains a strict requirement
for full disclosure of each party's assets."9 Such disclosure, on
forms supplied by the court, may be made jointly or individu-
ally. In order to facilitate disclosure, federal and state income
tax returns from two prior years are to be made available upon
motion of either party or at the initiative of the court. While
the court is required to order disclosure of two years' returns
upon motion of either party, it is also within the court's discre-
tion to order production of such returns for longer periods of
time. The disclosure provisions are enforced by two techniques.
Intentional or negligent failure to disclose assets having a value
equal or greater than $500 may result in the imposition of a
constructive trust on these assets. Upon petition of the ag-
grieved party, the court is required to create such a trust for
the benefit of the parties and their minor or dependent chil-
dren. Additionally, if either party fails to file the disclosure
108. 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 105, § 15.
109. Id. § 45.
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statements, the court may accept the other party's statement
of assets as accurate.
In keeping with a no-fault rationale, under the new law the
initial presumption in property division"0 is that all property
not inherited is to be equally divided. Such a division, however,
can be altered upon a consideration of certain listed factors.
Prior Wisconsin case law had held property division to be an
area within the sole discretion of the trial court"' but an early
Wisconsin case, Gauger v. Gauger, which termed a one-third
allowance to the wife as "liberal" was often cited as the starting
point of property divisions.12 As late as 1951 the court again
cited Gauger's statement which noted the maximum allowed
for the wife as one-half the property but the minimum to be
something less than one-third of the estates."' In 1970, how-
ever, in Lacey v. Lacey"' the court stressed the concept of
marriage as a partnership and set forth factors which should be
considered in property settlements; these factors demonstrated
the court's growing awareness of women's contribution to mar-
riages. These factors, which serve as the foundation of the list
in chapter 105, were incorporated into the Wisconsin Statutes
in 1973.115 The 1977 statute,"6 however, is even more sensitive
110. Id. § 41.
111. Horel v. Horel, 260 Wis. 336, 50 N.W.2d 673 (1952).
112. 157 Wis. 630, 147 N.W. 1075 (1914).
113. Hansen v. Hansen, 259 Wis. 485, 49 N.W.2d 434 (1951).
114. 45 Wis. 2d 375, 173 N.W.2d 142 (1970).
115. Wis. STAT. § 247.26 (1973).
116. Factors listed in 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 105, § 41 (to be codified as Wis. STAT. §
247.255) include:
(1) The length of the marriage.
(2) The property brought to the marriage by each party.
(3) The contribution of each party to the marriage, giving appropriate eco-
nomic value to each party's contribution in homemaking and child care services.
(4) The age and physical and emotional health of the parties.
(5) The contribution by one party to the education, training or increased
earning power of the other.
(6) The earning capacity of each party, including educational background,
training, employment skills, work experience, length of absence from the job
market, custodial responsibilities for children and the time and expense neces-
sary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party to become
self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed
during the marriage.
(7) The desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live therein
for a reasonable period to the party having custody of any children.
(8) The amount and duration of an order under s. 247.26 granting mainte-
nance payments to either party, any order for periodic family support payments
under s. 247.261 and whether the property division is in lieu of such payments.
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to women's issues and requires the court to consider such fac-
tors as "each party's contribution in homemaking and child
care services," the "contribution by one party to the education,
training or increased earning power of the other" and "absence
from the job market" prior to making a property division.
Moreover, the new statute's greater precision which requires
the court to consider other economic circumstances of the par-
ties such as their pension benefits and the tax consequences of
the division to each, should benefit both parties.
The new statute has replaced the term "alimony" with that
of "maintenance payments." Maintenance payments '17 can be
granted for any necessary length of time and are based on the
amount of help a needy spouse requires to become self-
supporting. Here also the new law lists factors that must be
considered prior to determination of the payment amount."'8 It
(9) Other economic circumstances of each party, including pension bene-
fits, vested or unvested, and future interests.
(10) The tax consequences to each party.
(11) Any written agreement made by the parties before or during the mar-
riage concerning any arrangement for property distribution; such agreements
shall be binding upon the court except that no such agreement shall be binding
where the terms of the agreement are inequitable as to either party. The court
shall presume any such agreement to be equitable as to both parties.
(12) Such other factors as the court may in each individual case determine
to be relevant.
117. 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 105, § 42.
118. Factors listed in 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 105, § 42 (to be codified as Wi. STAT. §
247.26) include:
(a) The length of the marriage.
(b) The age and physical and emotional health of the parties.
(c) The distribution of property made under s. 247.255.
(d) The educational level of each party at the time of marriage and at the
time the action is commenced.
(e) The earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance, including edu-
cational background, training, employment skills, work experience, length of
absence from the job market, custodial responsibilities for children and the time
and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the
party to find appropriate employment.
(f) The feasibility that the party seeking maintenance can become self-
supporting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during
the marriage, and, if so, the length of time necessary to achieve this goal.
(g) The tax consequences to each party.
(h) Any mutual agreement made by the parties before or during the mar-
riage, according to the terms of which one party has made financial or service
contributions to the other with the expectation of reciprocation or other compen-
sation in the future, where such repayment has not been made, or any mutual
agreement made by the parties before or during the marriage concerning any
arrangement for the financial support of the parties.
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should be noted that the new section 247.26 does not abolish
fault searching in the setting of maintenance payments as is
explicitly done in the property division section. Notwithstand-
ing the omission, it appears that case law from other jurisdic-
tions would not support admission of evidence of fault for this
purpose." 9
Child Custody and Support
Section 247.24 has been created to regulate child custody
determinations 2 ' and factors affecting these have also been
listed. Factors listed in the child custody statute1 21 can be seen
as elaborations of the "best interest" test of the old statute.
Following Wisconsin case .law,'2 the wishes of the child as to
placement are one consideration in the placement decision.
Significantly, for the first time, Wisconsin law now allows a
court to award joint custody to both parents if the parties agree
and if it is in the best interest of the child. The statute also
allows the consolidation of maintenance and child support pay-
ments into one payment called "family support" to assure that
the tax benefits of the rule of Lester will be available.23
Wage Assignments
Finally, the new law provides for a wage assignment which
becomes effective on the application of the receiving spouse if
child support and maintenance payments are not being made.
(i) Such other factors as the court may in each individual case determine
to be relevant.
119. See text accompanying note 91 supra.
120. 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 105, § 36.
121. Factors listed in 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 105, § 37 (to be codified as Wis. STAT. §
247.24 (1m)) include:
(a) The wishes of the child's parent or parents as to custody;
(b) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parent
or parents, siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the child's
best interest;
(c) The child's adjustment to the home, school, religion and community;
(d) The mental and physical health of the parties, the minor children and
other persons living in a proposed custodial household;
(e) The availability of public or private child care services; and
(f) Such other factors as the court may in each individual case determine
to be relevant.
122. See, e.g., Seelandt v. Seelandt, 25 Wis. 2d 73, 128 N.W.2d 66 (1964); Edwards
v. Edwards, 270 Wis. 48, 70 N.W.2d 22 (1955).
123. Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961) (permitted one party to deduct
from gross income periodic payments payable for the support of the spouse and minor
children which did not fix the specific amounts payable for the children's support).
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Wage assignments can also be applicable to orders from actions
affecting marriage which were commenced under the old law,
upon application of the person receiving payments. '24
CONCLUSION
No-fault divorce has been a reality in Wisconsin for a few
short months and it is still too early to make a thorough evalua-
tion of it merits. Yet the jurisdictions that have been operating
under similar no-fault laws appear to be satisfied with them
and much of the earlier criticism of the concept has subsided.
In general, no-fault divorce has been accomplishing what the
legislatures hoped it would. At this juncture there is little basis
for speculation that the underlying purposes of chapter 105 will
not be similarly realized in Wisconsin.
BLAISE Di PRONIO
124. 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 105, § 44. It should be noted that the Milwaukee County
Corporation Counsel has issued an opinion, contrary to the apparent intent of the
statute, indicating that ordering of wage assignment is discretionary rather than man-
datory even where the statutory requirements are met.
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